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R432cadherin stability. That the emergence
of p120 coincides with the first fully
functional classical cadherin complex,
and not with the a- and b-catenin
associated roles in Dictyostelium,
suggests that p120 was originally
introduced to the other catenins
through physical association with the
cadherins. Thus, it is possible that the
Dictyostelium and metazoan
complexes behave quite similarly with
respect to the ancient collaboration
between a- and b-catenins, and differ
primarily by the addition of p120 and
its roles in modulating cadherin
function. Regardless, this newperspective on a-catenin and the
extent of mechanistic similarity
between the Dictyostelium and
metazoan systems will be of interest
on multiple levels to cell and
evolutionary biologists alike.
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Human and Monkey MemoryHumans store a limited number of items in short-term working memory to
perform subsequent operations. A newly described assessment of memory in
rhesus monkeys suggests qualitative similarities and quantitative
dissimilarities to humans.Jonathon D. Crystal
The metaphor of the brain as a
computer dominates our thinking
about human cognition and memory
[1]. The metaphor highlights the digital
nature of modern computers and
applies related features to the
fascinating abilities that people have
to remember information from the
past when performing subsequent
operations on that information.
According to this perspective, human
memory consists of discrete slots that
store discrete pieces of information.
How much can be remembered
depends on the total number of slots
available (overall capacity), the
number of pieces of information
arriving at any one time (selective
attention), and the number of slots
already filled with old information
(memory load) [2,3]. Because this
classic perspective of cognitive
science predates many modern
discoveries about the brain, we might
wonder about the viability of the
hypothesis that the brain has discrete
slots to store discrete pieces of
information. As reported in this issue
of Current Biology, Elmore et al. [4]
have compared the memory capacity
of humans and rhesus monkeys withresults that raise serious questions
about this perspective.
In the new study [4], people or
monkeys viewed several objects, for
example, clip art icons, presented in an
array (Figure 1). After a brief delay,
another array of objects was
presented, but one object was
changed to a different item. The task
for the person or monkey was to
touch the changed object. Accuracy
in detecting the changed object
depends on the number of objects in
the initially presented display. The
capacity of short-term visual working
memory — the number of discrete
memory slots — can be estimated from
the functional change in accuracy with
display size. Following the
assumptions of a discrete-memory
model [5], Elmore et al. [4] estimated
that monkey visual short-term working
memory capacity is at most one item,
whereas capacity for humans was
estimated to be perhaps as large is
three items.
Is it possible that people remember
only three items and monkeys
remember only one item? The claim
that monkeys remember only one item
is particularly paradoxical given the
observed competency of monkeys in
reporting about lists of pictures orsounds as long as four items [6]. The
potential underestimate of capacity
may stem from the assumptions of
discrete memory slots. Indeed, when
a distributed, noisy memory
representation (consistent with
physiological properties of the brain [7])
is assumed, the data suggest that
visual short-term working memory in
humans and monkeys is a continuous
resource that is distributed among
many objects [4]. Limitations in
memory performance, according to
this continuous-resource view [8,9],
are a direct consequence of noise in
the internal representation of each
object rather than being due to a fixed
capacity of discrete items.
It is remarkable that a fundamental
discovery about the representation of
information in humans comes from
a paradox about memory in rhesus
monkeys. Hence, it is valuable to
reflect on the comparative origins
of this discovery. The key ingredient
in attempting to gain insight into
human cognition from work on an
animal model is the use of identical
tactics — the same procedures,
concepts, quantitative theories — for
testing both species, as in the work
of Elmore et al. [4]. By contrast, many
studies of cognition in animals have
used the same terminology [10], but
the procedures, concepts, and/or
quantitative theories have sometimes
been strikingly disconnected from
human research. Although there is the
appearance of comparability, the
disconnect may limit the discovery of
fundamental operating characteristics
of memory, which ultimately may limit
the ability to translate discoveries from
Figure 1. Change detection memory in rhesus monkeys and humans.
A monkey (A,B) or human (not shown) subject viewed a sample array (A) of clip art icons
displayed on a touch-sensitive computer screen. After presentation of a sample array of six
items (A) and a brief delay, a test array (B) was displayed. The test array consisted of an
icon that was presented earlier in the sample array (‘spinning wheel’, B) and an icon that
was changed (the ‘envelope’ in B replaced the ‘banana’ from A). Touching the changed item
(correct response) resulted in food/drink rewards for monkeys (a drinking spout and pellet
cup are below the screen at right and center, respectively, B) or a green light for people.
Touching the item that had not changed (incorrect response) resulted in the absence of reward
for monkeys or a red light for people. The sample display size was 2, 4, or 6 for monkeys and 2,
4, 6, 8, or 10 for people. (Photos courtesy of L. Caitlin Elmore and Anthony A. Wright.)
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R433animal models of memory to disorders
of memory in people [11,12]. Hence,
one lesson to be learned from the
paradox in the Elmore et al. [4] study is
the power of identical tactics.
Another recent advance illustrates
the renewed focus on identical tactics
in animal and human memory. Human
memory is often separately assessed
using tests of recognition and recall:
in recognition, the to-be-remembered
material is presented amidst novel
lures while you try to remember (a task
that may be solved by detecting which
items are familiar), whereas in recall,
the to-be-remembered information is
absent (which requires bringing the
memory to mind through recollection).
All tests of animal memory are arguably
recognition tests (familiarity memory).
Basile and Hampton [13] recently
reported in this journal the first
evidence that rhesus monkeys can
recall information that was not present
at the time of testing. In their
demonstration, monkeys reproduced
simple shapes from memory on a
touchscreen, in a way that is analogousto a child’s connect-the-dot game with
a uniform grid of dots. They found that
the memory performance of monkeys
paralleled that of humans in other recall
and recognition tests.
The theme of identical tactics has
a broader lesson for efforts to model
other types of memory from
a comparative perspective. Episodic
memory is memory for unique,
personal past experiences that
happened to you [14] and is profoundly
impaired in Alzheimer’s disease [15].
In the comparative study of episodic
memory, progress has been made in
modeling the content of episodic
memories in animals [16,17]; however,
these methods have not yet used
identical tactics. To develop
converging lines of evidence that
animals have episodic memories
[18,19], it will be critical to increase
the mapping of methods, concepts,
and quantitative measures. The use of
identical tactics in studying animals
and humans holds enormous potential
to translate discoveries of biological
properties of memory in animalpreclinical models to the study of
disorders of human memory. Hence,
the benefit may be an increase in the
ability to produce relief for people
suffering from profound impairments in
memory. Change-detection memory
may potentially be used to study
episodic memory [6,20], which would
greatly enhance similarity of tactics in
animal and human experiments. In
a change-detection memory task, icon
displays are presented sequentially,
and the ability to successfully detect
change is likely influenced by repeating
icons from time to time, thereby
promoting the development of
proactive interference between an icon
from a current study display and one
from an old study display [6]. A
significant challenge for a change-
detection approach will be to implicate
a role for recollection and rule out the
use of familiarity-based memory
processes.References
1. Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive Psychology (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts).
2. Cowan,N. (2001). Themagical number4 inshort-
term memory: A reconsideration of mental
storage capacity. Behav. Brain Sci. 24, 87–114.
3. Cowan, N. (2005). Working Memory Capacity
(New York: Psychology Press).
4. Elmore, L.C., Ma, W.J., Magnotti, J.F.,
Leising, K.J., Passaro, A.D., Katz, J.S., and
Wright, A.A. (2011). Visual short-term memory
compared in rhesus monkeys and humans.
Curr. Biol. 21, 975–979.
5. Eng, H., Chen, D., and Jiang, Y. (2005). Visual
working memory for simple and complex visual
stimuli. Psychonom. Bull. Rev. 12, 1127–1133.
6. Wright, A.A. (2007). An experimental analysis of
memory processing. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 88,
405–433.
7. Faisal, A.A., Selen, L.P.J., and Wolpert, D.M.
(2008). Noise in the nervous system. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 9, 292–303.
8. Wilken,P., andMa,W.J. (2004).Adetection theory
accountof changedetection. J.Vis.4, 1120–1135.
9. Bays, P.M., and Husain, M. (2008). Dynamic
shifts of limited working memory resources in
human vision. Science 321, 851–854.
10. Honig, W.K. (1978). Studies of working memory
in the pigeon. In Cognitive Processes in Animal
Behavior, S.H. Hulse, H. Fowler, and
W.K. Honig, eds. (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum),
pp. 211–248.
11. Baddeley, A. (1992). Working memory. Science
255, 556–559.
12. Lange, K.W., Sahakian, B.J., Quinn, N.P.,
Marsden, C.D., and Robbins, T.W. (1995).
Comparison of executive and visuospatial
memory function in Huntington’s disease and
dementia of Alzheimer type matched for degree
of dementia. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry
58, 598–606.
13. Basile, B., and Hampton, R.R. (2011). Monkeys
recall and reproduce simple shapes from
memory. Curr. Biol 21, 774–778.
14. Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of Episodic
Memory (New York: Oxford University Press).
15. Le Moal, S., Reymann, J.M., Thomas, V.,
Cattenoz, C., Lieury, A., and Allain, H. (1997).
Effect of normal aging and of Alzheimer’s
disease on episodic memory. Dement. Geriatr.
Cogn. Disord. 8, 281–287.
16. Clayton, N.S., Salwiczek, L.H., and
Dickinson, A. (2007). Episodic memory. Curr.
Biol. 17, R189–R191.
Current Biology Vol 21 No 11
R43417. Zhou, W., and Crystal, J.D. (2009). Evidence for
remembering when events occurred in a rodent
model of episodic memory. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 106, 9525–9529.
18. Crystal, J.D. (2009). Elements of episodic-like
memory in animal models. Behav. Process. 80,
269–277.19. Crystal, J.D. (2010). Episodic-like memory in
animals. Behav. Brain Res. 215, 235–243.
20. Wright, A.A., Katz, J.S., Magnotti, J.,
Elmore, L.C., Babb, S., and Alwin, S. (2010).
Testing pigeon memory in a change
detection task. Psychonom. Bull. Rev. 17,
243–249.Department of Psychological and Brain
Sciences, Indiana University, 1101 E 10th
Street, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA.
E-mail: jcrystal@indiana.edu
DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2011.04.027Primary Cilia: How to Keep the
Riff-Raff in the Plasma MembraneA recent report suggests that plasma membrane proteins are excluded from
primary cilia via anchoring to the cortical actin cytoskeleton. These findings
challenge the existence of a diffusion barrier at the base of the cilium.David K. Breslow
and Maxence V. Nachury
The primary cilium is a microtubule-
based organelle that exposes cell-
surface receptors and concentrates
signaling components [1]. The diversity
of signaling pathways organized by
cilia is evidenced by the variety of
symptoms — e.g. sensory defects,
skeletal dysplasia, kidney cysts, and
obesity — resulting from ciliary
dysfunction. Remarkably, primary cilia
are able to concentrate signaling
proteins despite the considerable
problem posed by the topological
continuity of the plasma and ciliary
membranes. Here, lateral diffusion
would predict that lipids and
membrane proteins should equilibrate
between these compartments, yet the
ciliary and plasma membranes are
known to contain distinct lipids and
proteins.
How then do cilia establish and
maintain the unique complement of
proteins and lipids required to organize
signal transduction? Previous studies
have indicated that a physical barrier
blocks lateral diffusion into and out of
cilia and that ciliary proteins contain
signals that enable them to cross this
barrier, either by vesicular trafficking or
by lateral transport from the plasma
membrane [2,3]. But are there also
mechanisms to prevent plasma
membrane proteins from entering cilia?
A recent report from the laboratory of
Ira Mellman now suggests that
tethering of plasmamembrane proteins
to the actin cytoskeleton, rather than
a diffusion barrier, serves to exclude
proteins from cilia [4].
These authors followedMadin-Darby
canine kidney (MDCK) cells throughapicobasal polarization and
ciliogenesis, focusing on podocalyxin/
gp135 (PODXL), a transmembrane
protein localized across the apical
surface but excluded from a region of
the apical membrane at the base of the
cilium [5]. The exclusion of proteins
such as PODXL from this periciliary
membrane domain (PCMD) had been
previously cited as evidence for the
existence of a periciliary diffusion
barrier encircling the PCMD [2,6].
Nonetheless, PODXL was also known
to be anchored to the cortical actin
cytoskeleton via binding of its PDZ
interaction motif to NHERF proteins. It
is this network of protein interactions
that Francis et al. [4] have found to be
required for exclusion of PODXL from
the PCMD (Figure 1A). Mutation of
PODXL’s PDZ motif or depletion of
NHERF1 allows PODXL to enter the
PCMD and increases its lateral mobility
(Figure 1B). Conversely, grafting this
PDZ motif (or other actin-tethering
elements) onto proteins that can
normally access the PCMD is sufficient
to exclude them from this region of the
apical membrane and decrease their
mobility.
Interestingly, mutation of the PDZ
domain of PODXL not only allows it
to enter the PCMD, but also to enter
the primary cilium, casting doubt
on the existence of a diffusion barrier
at the base of cilia that excludes
PODXL. Furthermore, Francis et al. [4]
find that glycosylphosphatidylinositol-
anchored GFP, a marker whose
apparent exclusion from cilia has been
cited as evidence for a diffusion barrier
[6,7], does in fact localize to cilia in live
cells. This discrepancy is attributed to
fixation artifacts and indicates that live
imaging is critical for studies of ciliarylocalization. However, caution must
also be exercised when expressing
exogenous proteins because the
cytoskeletal anchoring mechanism
is saturable and subject to
overexpression artifacts. On the basis
of these results, Francis et al. [4]
propose that there is no strict diffusion
barrier at the base of cilia and that
plasma membrane proteins are
instead excluded from the PCMD and
cilium by an actin-linked network of
protein–protein interactions
(Figure 1A). Furthermore, Francis et al.
[4] provide evidence that ciliary
enrichment in the absence of restricted
diffusion may be enabled by analogous
tethering to axonemal microtubules.
The work of Francis et al. [4] raises
important questions regarding the
partitioning of membrane proteins
between the ciliary and plasma
membranes, especially in light of
previous data indicating that primary
cilia do possess a diffusion barrier.
Specifically, Hu et al. [7] used
fluorescence recovery after
photobleaching (FRAP) to show that
ciliary membrane proteins are highly
mobile within cilia and within the
plasma membrane but are not able
to diffuse readily between these
compartments. Additionally, several
groups [6,8,9] have reported that the
ciliary membrane is enriched in specific
lipids. How the lipid content of ciliary
and plasma membranes is prevented
from equilibrating is not known, but
a diffusion barrier is an appealing and
plausible mechanism.
If there is a ciliary diffusion barrier,
what might be its molecular basis?
One candidate is septins, which Hu
et al. [7] recently found to localize at
the base of cilia and to limit diffusion
of membrane proteins into cilia.
Alternatively, diffusion could be
restricted by increased membrane
order [6] or high curvature at the base
of cilia, as is especially apparent in
cilia with a prominent ciliary pocket
[10]. Yet another possibility is
suggested from studies on the
diffusion barrier that separates the
